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Why do philosophers and literary theorists consistently return to the ques
tion of ethical behavior in Henry James, a writer who, as Lee Clark Mitchell
recently observed, "resists any simple notion of human psychology or ethical
engagement"?1 As we struggle to understand Isabel Archer's return to her disas

trous marriage, Lambert Strether's commitment to the fantasy of Madame de
Vionnet, Maggie Verver's agonized contemplation of a successfully imprisoned
Amerigo, and Milly Theale's construction of a space in which she can hold on to
her desire, we are riveted by the complexity of these characters' emotional and
ethical responses. We return to James not only because his characters' dilemmas

refuse simple resolutions (perhaps any resolution) but also because we experi
ence the suffering and paradoxical triumph of those who pursue their desire to
its most far-reaching conclusion. James's characters are nothing if not willful—

and ultimately alone—in their quests. Like figures from ancient Greek drama,
they demand everything and give up nothing, enacting Jacques Lacan's ethical
claim that "the only thing of which one can be guilty is of having given ground
relative to one's desire."2 In doing so, these characters seem to call into question,

or at least complicate, the Kantian categorical imperative and the ideal of disin
terested action, offering a radical ethical alternative. James's characters enact, I
will argue, an ethic of desire.
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My intention here is not to reduce James's late novel to an ethical treatise but,

rather, to retrieve it from a kind of situational relativism that has long been con

sidered, from a humanist perspective, to be antithetical to ethics. A number of
critics have suggested that James's protagonists engage, implicitly or explicitly, in

unethical behavior, in what Sharon Cameron calls, for example, a "phenomenol
ogy of domination" as they construct fantasies of others that match their private

desires.3 In keeping with Lacan's purposeful antihumanism, I will argue in con
trast that James's characters pursue their desires in a way that leads to the discov
ery and enactment of a personal ethic, an ethic that challenges the illusory notion
of the coherent subject.4
Refusing to cede one's desire leads to an awareness of the void around which

reality is structured, what Lacan frames as "the Real."5 For Alain Badiou, as for

Lacan, our normal lives are structured around the repression of the Real, and
access to our subjectivity can occur only through an essential encounter, an event

that "punches a hole" in the "instituted knowledges of the situation."6 Badiou
argues, following Lacan, that the individual emerges as an ethical subject by hold

ing fast to the particular truth that arises from such an Event.7 This encounter

offers a foundational moment for ethical action, because the individual who is
wholly committed to her desire comes into being as a subject—not the illusory
coherent subject of humanism, but the shattered subject who has encountered her

finitude. Lacans and Badiou's grounding of ethical behavior in the emergence of
subjectivity is especially relevant to James, for, consistently, as the characters of the

late novels and tales pursue the beast in their respective jungles, they come to see

that the promise of desire—personal fulfillment, coherence of the self—is an

empty space.8 Why is confronting finitude the basis for an ethical position?
Because it allows the individual to begin (to act) from a wholly subjective orienta
tion, in opposition to "the reality that commands and regulates."9
In The Wings oj the Dove, "the great smudge of mortality across the picture"

that Milly apprehends almost from her first appearance on the scene may be
understood as an intrusion of the traumatic Real,10 because it serves as a kind of
rupturing event, "something which turns [her] symbolic universe upside down

and leads [her] to reconfigure it."11 Milly's response to her death sentence con
stitutes what James refers to in his preface as "the insurpassable activity of pas

sionate, of inspired resistance."12 From the moment she gazes at the Bronzino
and tells Lord Mark, "I shall never be better than this'" (144), Milly understands
that she "must pay any price for access to desire," and that "the hero[ine] trem
bles before nothing, especially not before the good of the other."13
I propose that we imagine a series of ethical moves through a reading of The

Wings of the Dove, borrowing Badiou's notion that poetry can assume certain of

philosophy's functions: "at the very locus where philosophy falters a poem is a

locus of language wherein a proposition about being... is enacted."141 suggest
that we begin by reconsidering Socrates's question (as Martha Nussbaum so
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beautifully framed it in her seminal philosophical discussion of

Bowl15), "How shall we live?" from the point of view of the individu

ter) who refuses to cede her desire. Perhaps more than any other
James, Milly Theale enacts this ethic. Despite her seeming passivity,

from the beginning of her story in a terrifying battle with her mor

poignantly embraces the void upon which her subjectivity must

Milly's emerging ethic, however, is not based solely on the fact of h

doom, but on the choices she makes in dealing with this knowle
cally, her decision to hold fast to her desire, fully aware of the way

ture forces her to confront the intimate relationship betwee

mortality.16 Milly's ethic will also be explored in a broader sense a

the effect of her actions on her antagonists—actions that will create
ethical rupture for them.

II

From the standpoint of traditional ethics, The Wings of the Dove has long been read

as a study of desire and betrayal, as critics and philosophers from Millicent Bell

to Robert B. Pippin have examined Kate Croy's and Merton Densher's violation

of Milly Theale.17 Milly's "tragic beauty," her rueful acceptance of meanings
imposed by others, and her "self-definition through opposition, resignation, or

transcendence" have been thoughtfully explored.18 Her antagonists' failure to
treat her as a subject has been contrasted to Milly's ethic of generous love, offer

ing readers a neat binary between good and evil, but one that obscures the pow
erful dimension of desire in shaping each of these characters' responses to their

respective destinies.19 For Kate, for Densher, and for Milly, an ethical moment

arises that forces the question, demands that they make a decision: to abandon
all or to remain faithful to their desire. According to Alenka Zupancic, such an
ethical moment "makes us ask, will I act in conformity with what threw me out
of joint; will I be able to reformulate what has hitherto been the foundation of my
existence?"20

In this context, perhaps we have not fully seen Milly Theale: we have not
understood the ethical nature of her position; that is, we have failed to grasp her
insight into the power of desire, its capacity to help her imagine herself as a (shat
tered) subject.21 Milly actively confronts her mortality in almost every scene, and

she builds her ethic by seizing and holding fast to her desire in the face of its
impossibility. Early in the novel, when Sir Luke Strett confirms her fear that she
does not have long to live, Milly transforms her terror into an opportunity: "The

beauty of the bloom had gone from the small old sense of safety—that was dis
tinct: she had left it behind her there for ever. But the beauty of the idea of a great

adventure, a big dim experiment or struggle in which she might, more responsi
bly than ever before, take a hand, had been offered her instead" (162). In the days
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following her doctor's revelation, Milly sees herself as entirely alone ("nobody in

the world knew where she was") yet, paradoxically, at one with other "anxious

wanderers" in this "grim breathing space" (163). Her connection to another
tragic heroine who knows she is doomed may clarify the nature of her position.

Like Antigone, Milly confronts a "catastrophe" that is already "determined" and

she knows it.22 For Lacan, Antigone's ethical "splendour" emerges through her
sustained commitment to her desire, even though she knows that "her race is run
. . . that she advances toward nothing."23 If Milly enacts the allegory of sacrifice,

that of the pharmakos or scapegoat who must be expelled, who must die for the

community to heal, she transforms this ancient gesture into its postmodern
counterpart, following desire beyond the limit until she enters the space in which
it is purified, emptied of content; she becomes, thereby, a true "being for death."24

On one level every character in The Wings of the Dove, quite convincingly,

pursues his or her desire. But if Milly, like Antigone, remains true to her real

desire, her antagonists, like Creon, pursue all that masquerades as desire but
really reflects its suppression. Kate (with Densher reluctantly in tow) founds her
notion of desire and fulfillment on a presumed fullness of being (a coherence) to

be derived from the goods of the world: if she can acquire money and social sta
tus (along with Densher), the void will be filled. But traditional ethics, as Lacan
argues, substitutes what you are supposed to do for the truth of desire, and an
ethic founded on "the order of power" and the "service of goods" can only result
in self-betrayal.25 Just as Creon loses from the moment he places the well-being
of the state before personal desire, from the moment that Kate confuses the goods

of the world for her real desire (not only for Densher but, more deeply, for her
incomplete self), she is lost. The point is not merely that Kate, like Creon, has sold
out; it is that she believes the desire of the Other, represented, most forcefully, by

Maud Lowder, has content: that it will make her whole.
The desiring stance of each of the major characters in The Wings of the Dove
is explicitly linked to this quest for wholeness, and in the opening chapters James
shows how people may be led to misrecognize themselves through the lens of the
social world. Each of the three major characters is initially "called into a picture"

and caught in its trap:26 each, like Milly, is "photographed... framed and glazed"

(155). Where Kate succumbs to this misrecognition and Densher is paralyzed by
it, Milly discovers in the gaze of the world her own mortality and, through it, the
source of her desire.

In the novel's opening scene, Kate Croy examines her literal reflection in the

glass over the mantel in her sister's lodgings and vows to make her beauty work
for her: "If she saw more things than her fine face in the dull glass ... she might

have seen that... she was not herself a fact in the collapse" (7). Kate sets out to
become the powerful, coherent "self' she believes is essential for her to succeed
as she imagines doing what her father has failed to do for the family: "the broken
sentence, if she was the last word, would end with a sort of meaning" (7). But Kate
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misses the connection between her own (self-) representational

her father, whom she condemns for his successful self-renderin

. .. perfect look" (8) that has enabled him to deal out "lies" (8).
A mirror is also offered to Densher when he is invited to Mrs

one-sided discussion of his relationship with Kate. And while he w

the language of her "house" speaks to him, offering him "a por

of his own world of thought" (55). In response, he silently imagin

nalistic skills might be used to undermine Mrs. Lowder's social

success ("He would write about the heavy horrors that could st
an age so proud of its short way with false gods" [54]). But when

is quickly diminished by Maud's powerful gaze. Her silence (her r

with him in a discussion of Kate) is a "drawn blind"; "the great

face" denies him a representation (57). Yet the emptiness Dens

his recognition of literal impotence (he finds himself "in the ca

without his whip" [ 54]), is important because it points to the voi

stand as the essential emptiness that his desire masks.

In contrast to her antagonists, from the outset Milly recogniz

sion of coherence offered by the reflected image is a trap. In the B

which Lord Mark takes her to see because it reminds him of he

ately perceives the way a socially sanctioned wholeness betrays

emptiness. The Bronzino shows Milly what she believes she des

cent" completion, but the face of the woman in the portrait al

Lacan calls the "anamorphic blot"—that which "reflects our ow

the figure of the death's head."27 In identifying with this image

ously sees the impossibility, but also the necessity, of her efforts to

Unlike Kate and Densher, Milly recognizes the paradoxical trut

live as if her desire is realizable even though she knows it is not.

uses to define herself, Aunt Maud's withering gaze, through whic

riences his emotional and ethical absence (his inability to defen

Kate), and Milly's Bronzino, through which she recognizes the

desire, all of these "mirrors" expose the lie implicit in the strugg

For Kate, the mirror provides an illusion that she is too proud to
more than a mirage; it formulates for her a desire that is not her

will cling to until she is thoroughly lost. For Densher, the emp

image reflected in Maud's gaze will force him to initiate his str

charts his complicated course between Kate and Milly, he will

dictory images that chart his self-betrayal until he understands h

But for Milly, the mirror offered by the Bronzino portrait reflects

see, the void that permeates existence. "Fastened to a dying a
fronts her mortality in its purest form, and in recognizing the

center of her desire, the fundamental impossibility of her dream
her own fragile and permanently incomplete self.28
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Before his heroine is given a place on the stage, James introduces the ethical
dilemma of those who are most tied to the world, what Lacan calls the "order of
power."29 As Kaja Silverman explains, "What is determinative for each of us is not

how we would like to see ourselves, but how we are perceived by the cultural
gaze."30 We may infer from the way Kate is drawn ever more deeply into a com

promising loss of "self' thatjames, like Freud and like Lacan, is deeply suspicious
of the pathogenic nature of civilized morality. Even though Kate justifies her logic

as she imagines retrieving her family name ("it was the name above all she would

take in hand" [7]), Kate's pursuit of "fortune and honor" (5) shows the obvious
dangers of an ethic tied to the cultural gaze. Like other notable Jamesian heroines
(Isabel Archer and Maggie Verver), what Kate truly fears and avoids is, precisely,

her desire. As Eve Sedgwick observes, "For all Kate's sharp decisiveness, she uses

her high abilities to postpone, always, instead of expediting—where postpone
ment means keeping her place in the circle of petticoats, the circuit of mediated

desires."31 But just as Milly confronts the Bronzino, recognizing the death mask
it imposes, Kate also discerns the self-alienation she is engaged in as she "learn [s]

in every way to express the part... for the character she had undertaken" (217).
However, in contrast to Milly, Kate represses her knowledge.

Refusing to give up the money and position that her aunt promises, brack
eting her feelings for Densher and forcing him to follow suit, Kate begins to sac

rifice her desire. Evidence of the problematic nature of her worldly approach to
ethics is offered as she justifies her goals according to a pseudo-utilitarian model:

everyone benefits—Milly will have a piece of happiness, and Kate and Densher
will have her money. Despite her avowal of love ("I engage myself to you forever

... I give you every drop of my life" [66]), at no point does Kate imagine the pos

sibility of fulfillment through Densher alone—not in a world where "fortune"
counts more than self-knowledge. James makes it clear from the beginning that
Kate's ethics are compromised, that something has "tampered with her spring,"32

and although her poignant awareness that she is being used renders her sympa
thetic, James continues to emphasize the way she is consistently co-opted by
those she condemns most. If Kate seems enraged at her family's fetishizing her as

their only object of value ("I am on the counter when I am not in the shop win
dow; in and out of which I'm thus conveniently, commercially whisked" [181]),
she dutifully incorporates the values of these choral figures who urge her to auc

tion herself, accepting—however ambivalently—her marketability as a valid
path to the fulfillment of her desire.

Despite her willfulness, her powerful energy, and her superficial control, Kate
gradually becomes the perfect surface upon which the desires of others may be reg
istered, and her efforts to shape her destiny are consistently undermined by her self

representational acts.33 In one of the few moments of "truth" for Kate—when she
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holds her own image up for critique—she warns Milly that she is

seems:" Oh you may very well loathe me yet!" (184). Although Kate qu

from this moment of self-revelation, embracing Milly and becoming o

heroine of the fairy tale Milly needs to believe in, Kate's facility in mak

exposes the layered, ethically compromising function of self-represent

the reflected image continues to embody an escape from rather than
of the fundamental "lack" that drives her desire. When Densher force
to his rooms (threatening to leave Venice, and Milly, immediately if

Kate registers the distance she has traveled from him—and from her or

There is nothing in this moment for her: she agrees to come, not to p

and certainly not for herself, but to force him to complete his task,

representation she has constructed to deceive Milly.

But if Kate seems to believe in the promise of an ideal social self,

itly concedes what she has already lost ("The way to pity me, if th

want, is to believe in me" [450]), she tells Densher toward the end

Like Sophocles's Creon, as Lacan describes him, she has become "dea

living," for she has "literally lost all other goods."34 Even Densher's fi

marry you, mind you, in an hour" [457]) cannot alter Kate's dec

money, the excremental "gold," means more to her than the truth o

The point is not so much that Kate violates the categorical imperativ

ment of Milly (one might even argue perversely that she does not: t

all, if dying, like to receive the gift of love—even if it is an illusion);

is no longer "herself'—actually or potentially. In the end, the hous

and the social order it represents, is always an empty space—and K
discovers that she has ceased to be in the picture.

However, toward the end of the novel, James simultaneously s

complicates Kate's apparent coldness and calculation by returning h

ter's "sordid" lodgings, where her story began, and where she is deal

father once again. Densher sees, ruefully, that while "he could have l
a place," Kate would never survive in surroundings that are "ugly to
being sinister" (430). In the end, Kate partially redeems herself, not

Densher, we feel "specially sorry for her" (430) but because she

Milly. She may recognize, finally, that Milly's money will not make h

her real insight comes from a deepening awareness of Milly's effec

When he refuses to read Milly's letter, she tells him, "You're afraid of

She died for you then that you might understand her" (456). In fact,

standing will be necessary for Densher's belated conversion to an et

IV

A good analyst might ask, since it is clear from the beginning that Ka

sible choice, what is Densher doing with her? From an ethical perspe
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have focused on Densher's moral failure, his self-righteous projection of blame for
Milly's death onto Lord Mark, his untenable distinction between actions and words
(which even Kate in the end finds repellent), and his unconvincing conversion to
Milly's love.35 Less attention has been paid to Densher's early recognition of the fun

damental impossibility of his choice, confirmed not only by Aunt Maud's rejecting

gaze but in numerous other instances of dissonance as he registers his incompati
bility with Kate's world. Except for their one furtive meeting in Venice, Densher
admits, ruefully, that he has no place to take his love; their early coming together

on imagined ladders overlooking separate gardens (38) only underscores the
impossibility of their ever uniting in the "real" world.

How, then, does Densher conceive of his desire? From the beginning, he is
the most conflicted figure in the novel: if he believes his desire is realizable if only

Kate would come to her senses, he also gradually discovers that Kate's creative
and perverse arrangement of their lives, her consistent deferral, is precisely that

which defines his desire, enabling him to experience "the spark of conflict ever
latent in the depths of passion" (199).36 When Densher gives in to Kate's demand
that he pledge himself to her but deny it to the world and pursue Milly instead,
he does so believing, paradoxically, that in this way he is being true to Kate: "Not

to give away the woman one loved, but to back her up in her mistakes . . . that

was perhaps chief among the inevitabilities of the abjection of love" (245). In
response to Kate's inaccessibility, like the hero of a courtly love romance, Densher
will submit to whatever test or demand his love sets for him. But the feminine
object in the courtly love model is not only by definition inaccessible; she is also,

according to Lacan, a metonymy for the Thing (das Ding)—"the object forever
lost around which the subject and his desire revolve."37 The darkness she embod
ies will gradually reveal the true nature of desire to Densher, its connection to his

lack, his incompletion.
When he succeeds in convincing Kate to come to his rooms in Venice, Den
sher begins to understand this emptiness around which desire is constructed.
Only after Kate has left Venice is Densher able to truly experience her presence:
"It played for him—certainly in this prime afterglow—the part of a treasure kept,
at home, in safety and sanctity, something he was sure of finding in its place when,

with each return, he worked his heavy old key in the lock" (348). Densher sees,
finally, that real fulfillment occurs not in the moment of passion (which is sup
pressed, significantly, in the text) but in the moment of recollection that follows.

In his private vigil he discovers that the real object of his desire is not the elusive
Kate but, rather, the "hallucination of intimacy" (348), the fantasy of something
he has always already lost. But another kind of Event or intervention will be nec

essary for him to understand the connection between desire and loss; it will
require Milly Theale.
Although some critics feel that Densher's relationship with Milly is not suc

cessfully realized, and it is true that his deepening feelings for her cannot be
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squared with his asking Kate to marry him again in the novel's closing scenes,
during the period Densher remains in Venice, he begins to see Milly as a subject.
Milly's impossibility, a more final impossibility than that of Kate, facilitates the

final turn where Densher will discover the meaning—and the ethics—of desire.

Crossing the "threshold" into Milly's Venetian palace he sees "all the elements
compose differently" (315), and he knows what he must do: he executes the task
of "Hermes" (James's name for him in his preface),38 guiding Milly to the Under

world. But Milly is now the "Lorelei" (also James's reference) who will draw Den

sher into her pool, stifling other voices with her siren song: "The unexpected
impression made by pure pale, exquisite Milly as the mistress of the grand old
palace . . . this spectacle had for him an eloquence, an authority, a felicity for

which... he had not consciously bargained" (316). When Milly approaches the
"space" where Densher keeps his memory of Kate under lock and key (she asks
if she may visit him in his rooms), she directly challenges Kate's supremacy.
Although Densher hesitates, there is a powerful shift in his emotions as he offers

Milly Kate's "place": "He felt himself smiling through a mist... his great scruple
suddenly broke giving way to something inordinately strange.... 'You can come

when you like'" (355). In this extraordinary moment of ethical "rupture," Den
sher sacrifices Kate for Milly, dimly discerning, but not yet fully grasping what has

taken place: his "symbolic universe" has been "turned upside down," and he now
begins to reconfigure it.39
In a private vigil (the reflective epiphany that is, everywhere, the moment of

truth in James), Densher confronts the delicate and dangerous power of his own
acts of representation, the fact that he has lied to Milly, even if only by silence and

omission, and that he is now responsible for her: "He felt himself shut up in a
room on the wall of which something precious was too precariously hung" (358).
Ever so subtly, Densher's own identity has been incorporated into their exchange
so that to betray Milly is now, also, to betray himself. Neither his early fantasy of

successful textual intervention (when he imagines he will be able to write about

and rise above Aunt Maud's "heavy horrors" and "false gods" [54]) nor his nos
talgic imprisonment of Kate in his rooms have led him to a deeper understand
ing of his desire. But the "melancholy music" (316) foreshadowing Milly's death
anticipates the permanent loss that will become the real object of Densher's quest:

when he sacrifices Milly's letter and renders her his permanently unattainable
object of desire, he encounters his own incomplete self.

V

Of the three characters, it is Milly who pursues her desire with the greatest fidelity,

in a way that transforms her antagonists, and perhaps her readers. From begin

ning to end, Milly remains eerily separate, evincing a poignant grasp of the
impossibility—and the necessity—of her desire. From the first moment we see
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her, seated on a "precipitous" and "dizzy edge" (83) of an alpine path,40 Milly
occupies a privileged ethical position. Even before she is confronted with the
Bronzino, she reads her destiny in the collective gaze of the others: they "might

almost terribly have suggested that her doom was to live fast" (106). In almost
every reflective moment, she contemplates her absolute solitude: "no one in the

world could have sufficiently entered into her state" (161); "no tie would have

been close enough to enable a companion to walk beside her without some dis
parity" (247). But where Kate, however willful, remains until the end an actress
on the stage of Maud's (and her family's) desire and an image of Densher's impos

sible longing (both positions in which she is the object of another's gaze), Milly
pursues her desire to love and be loved in defiance of social realities she tacitly

recognizes (Kate's relationship with Densher; the Lowder entourage's self
absorbed use of her). Despite her seeming victimization, Milly is the most effec
tive composer in the novel. Her innocent bedazzlement as she enters the London

scene, seeing her surroundings, and even other people, as "touches in a picture
and denotements in a play" (98), fails to conceal the way she shapes the contents
of her picture according to her desire.
Milly begins by imagining other characters as if they are there for her own

private purpose and use. In her initial discovery of Kate, she engages in an objec
tification that matches Kate's own tendency to use others for her private purpose:
"She placed this striking young person from the first in a story, saw her for a hero

ine" (114). From the outset, Kate is someone whom Milly will be able to define
according to her fantasy: "Kate had, for her new friend's eyes, the extraordinary

attaching property of appearing at a given moment to show as a beautiful
stranger, to cut her connexions and lose her identity, letting the imagination for

the time make what it would of them" (138). This subtly aggressive composi
tional stance (not unlike Maggie Verver's in the second half of The Golden Bowl)

expands in subsequent scenes as Milly becomes the object of Densher's desire by

assuming Kate's identity, almost literally entering the physical and emotional
space of her friend—in order to live (and to be loved), however vicariously, at
least for a moment. With voyeuristic pleasure, Milly regards Kate "in the light of

... the identity she would have for Mr. Densher" (152). Through Kate, Milly expe
riences Densher's loving gaze as if it were directed toward her: "Just so was how

she [Kate] looked to him [Densher], andjust so was how Millywas held by her—

held as by the strange sense of seeing through that distant person's eyes"
(167-68). What greater evidence of her knowledge of their relationship could be
offered than this gentle but purposeful acceptance of Densher's gaze as she imag

ines herself "embodying" Kate?
As Kate and Densher proceed with their plan, Milly apprehends their actions

in such a way that their ethical duplicity may be both seen and overlooked,
accepting a representation that serves her as much as it does her antagonists. Her

belief in Kate and Densher is tested only to be reaffirmed when she discovers
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them together in the National Gallery. Recognizing that their presence there
together betrays an intimacy they have denied to her, she nonetheless accepts
(albeit uncomfortably) the composition they present: "Merton Densher was in
love, and Kate couldn't help it—could only be sorry and kind... she [Milly] tried
it as a cover, tried it hard . . . pulled it over her . . . drew it up to her chin with

energy" (194). In short, Milly continues to pursue the truth of her desire, to
believe in Densher, knowing that this truth is as impossible as her own literal sur

vival.41 In contrast to Kate's blind pursuit of completion through the socially
sanctioned demands of Aunt Maud, and in contrast to Densher's struggle to imag

ine his fulfilled desire in the space of its absence (the memory of Kate in his
rooms), Milly consciously invests both Kate and Densher with meaning, know
ing that her belief in them is, in large measure, her construction.

Like Maggie Verver, who transforms herself from passive "doll" to Princess

through her successive encounters with images constructed by Charlotte and
Amerigo, Milly accepts the identity bestowed on her by others (such as Kate's
benediction: "you're a dove" [ 184]), but her acceptance is far from a submission:

"It was... like an inspiration: she found herself accepting as the right one, while

she caught her breath with relief, the name so given her" (184). Milly's active
adoption of the "dovelike" becomes a compositional strategy that gives her the
strength to control what her antagonists see, and, in effect, to transform their

understanding of her, and, ultimately, of themselves. Like the ironic "trophy"
Milly carries away from Sir Luke Strett, Kate's benediction is another death knell,
but it is one Milly transforms through her own special alchemy: "it lighted up the
strange dusk in which she lately had walked" (184). In the role of the "dove," fully

conscious that she is approaching the end of her journey, Milly brings her
entourage to Venice, almost literally submerging them in her watery tomb. Her

friendly antagonists agree to enact her fantasy (that she will be able to remain
"aloft forever"; "never going down" [292]), and she agrees not to question them.

When she takes possession of her palace, "the ark of her deluge" (289), Milly
seems to accept the presence of death in a new way, announcing to Lord Mark, "I

think I should like to die here" (295). And when Lord Mark offers her unspeci
fied, but seemingly irrevocable proof that Kate and Densher are engaged, Milly's

fantasy space is shattered and she must confront the void. But in a sense Lord

Mark confirms something she already knows: that her desire is constructed
around impossibility. As Milly "turns her face to the wall" (401), she reveals the
"triumph of being for death," for, as Lacan explains, the tragic heroine shows us
that access to desire "necessitates crossing not only all fear but all pity."42
Milly transforms tragedy into triumph by offering Densher, on her deathbed,

and beyond her death, the gift of love: she insists on her belief in him despite the

evidence of his betrayal. As Kaja Silverman explains, glossing Lacan, to give some
one "the active gift of love" means to idealize the other, "to confer ideality not to find

it—but to do so knowingly, and without forgetting for a moment that he or she is
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also a subject marked by lack."43 Milly's gift transforms Densher's desire into love
and initiates Densher's movement from desire to love, as Lacan describes it: "Love
is distinct from desire... because its aim is not satisfaction, but being."44 As she is

dying, and after her death, Milly tacitly shows Densher how to understand his
desire and his lack. She invites him to follow his desire to the place where it is
empty, where he confronts her death and her loss: it is the place where pleasure

becomes pain, what Lacan calls jouissance, and Densher experiences the paradox
ical satisfaction of suffering.45 He is summoned for a final interview, suppressed in

the text but one in which he feels he has been "forgiven, dedicated, blessed" (416).
Milly's forgiveness is further confirmed by her letter, even though the contents of

this letter are also suppressed. But Milly's letter will enable Densher—and even,
reluctantly, Kate—to understand loss as the central feature of desire, and the nec
essary condition for the emergence of subjectivity.

VI

"Instead of suggesting how we should live," Mitchell observes, James's novels
invite us "to respond in pity, terror, exhilaration, sheer wonder at how far outside

the normal bounds these characters are subjected."46 The ending of The Wings of

the Dove offers nothing less than the kind of philosophical poetry we have been
tracing, and the catharsis Mitchell describes from a reader's point of view may also

be applied to James's characters' final struggle with desire, with self-knowledge,

with ethical awareness. Tragedy reminds us of the need for a limit situation for
the ethical subject to emerge,47 an Event that, as Badiou frames it, "compels the

subject to invent a new way of being."48 Slowly, in closing scenes of the novel,

the space of reflection and recognition, we witness, through the metaphorical
embrace of Milly's "wings," and through the advent of her letter, the emergence
of an ethic based on fidelity to one's desire.
Thus far we have examined Kate's betrayal of her desire, her consistent priv

ileging of the big Other, Densher's ethical crisis and partial transformation, and

Milly's gift of love to her antagonists: her decision to believe in them with the
knowledge of their betrayal. But in the final chapters James moves us to a more
reflective place. In a sense the whole novel may be read as a movement from wait
ing (Milly waits to die, Kate waits for the money, Densher waits to understand) to

stillness to silence, and in the penultimate scenes James uses Densher to distill
the significance of the action. While he is far from a tragic hero in a classical sense,

James places the act of interpretation squarely on his shoulders, and his emerg
ing understanding is imbued with a tragic sensibility as he registers error and
guilt, waste and loss, and, finally, purification and love.
When Densher returns to London, knowing Milly will soon die, he struggles
to understand the two faces of desire; comparing what Kate and Milly offer him, he

imagines his choices "as close as a pair of monsters he might have felt on either
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cheek (422). He proceeds to construct two incompatible texts,

and Kate are reunited; the other in which he lives with the memor

delay of three weeks, he meets with Kate and tells her that they
pretense and marry, that only this decisive act will make things

if he hopes to overcome the split in his consciousness by actin

original desire.49 When Kate makes it clear, once again, that she wi

if he is certain they will inherit Milly's money, he begins to und

never been the object of her desire, but what emerges in the no

much more than Densher's recognition of his "wasted passion"

Beyond his guilt (which persists despite his projection ol b

Mark and even his shabby treatment of Kate), beyond his aware

waste of Milly's life, Densher discovers his connection to Mill

mate recesses of his being. His attitude toward his own desire u

radical transformation, and, ironically, it is Aunt Maud, once ag

the mirror so that he may see himself—a mirror that now refle

sher has lived. Recollecting his final interview with Milly, and re

Maud, Densher sees himself in the eyes of the other, watches h

person he has created for Milly: "The young man, at these mom

too distant and too strange, for the right identity; and yet outs

was his own face Densher had known" (416).50 Like Milly's adopt

of the dove as an emotional truth for her, Densher recognizes

lover. As he awaits the news of her death, he discovers that his

become his "greatest reality" (412).51 Just as Hamlet discovers h

subjectivity) at Ophelia's grave because he experiences simulta

ness and his fullness through her loss (with the knowledge

which subjectivity rests), Densher, in contemplating the de
fronts, for the first time, his own shattered subjectivity.52

This confrontation is dramatized in what is perhaps the most

psychologically brutal—scene in the novel. Densher offers Kat
deathbed letter as his "sacrifice" in return for her visit to him in

Jiis acknowledgment that she submitted to him without desir

;osses Milly's unopened letter into the fire, she unwittingly sets the

.mportant discovery: this irretrievable loss reveals to Densher t

iesire.53 It is the letter of love that has been in plain sight all alon

iccosts and holds Densher fast.34 Milly's gift of love, her letter and

minates her ethical fullness (her consistent commitment to h

sher experiences her loss as something profoundly painful ("li

something sentient and throbbing" [451]) but at the same tim

something that fulfills a new kind of longing ("he kept it back l

eft it behind him, so to say when he went out, but came home a

:he certainty of finding it there" [450]).55 In this moment, Den

ibility to give: he becomes a "father, baffled and tender" to Milly,
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(450). He now stands in an authentic relationship to his desire, not because Milly

now replaces Kate, thus making the lie he has lived true, but because her letter
punches a hole in his established understanding: he begins to grasp the mysterious
truth, that "there is nothing of significance that can fill the hole in the real."56 As

Lacan explains it, "None of the symbolic objects we invest with meaning in order
to 'gratify' our desire can ever be adequate"; the "work of mourning... is performed
to satisfy the disorder that is produced by [this] inadequacy. "57 This powerful scene

forwards Densher's movement toward ethical awareness: Milly has been elevated
to the status of the permanently lost object, and even Kate understands the way
Densher is altered by the Event of the lost letter. "You're afraid—it's wonderful!—
to be in love with her" (455).

In fact, Kate's deep intelligence permits one last ethical turn in the closing
scene of the novel as she works to understand the choice Densher offers her.

Accepting his claim that he was not in love with Milly while she was alive, she
insists that he is now. When he asks her, finally, to choose (between him and
Milly's money), she demands that he tell her he is not in love with Milly's mem

ory: "don't speak as if you couldn't be. I could in your place; and you're one for

whom it will do. Her memory's your love. You want no other" (456). Densher
refuses to answer, and Kate, literally, has the last word ("We shall never be again

as we were!" [457]). But if Milly's ethical stance has penetrated to the heart and
transformed Densher's desire, it has also reached Kate. However self-serving Kate

may sound in claiming that she and Densher have given Milly what she wanted,
in the end it is she who truly understands Milly's point of view and her gift—that

is, she understands the full dimension of Milly's fidelity to her desire: "She did it

for us" (456). Kate articulates, in other words, what Densher only imagines, "the

turn [Milly] would have given her act" (450) had they been able to read her let
ter, which is to say, had they been able to understand the ethics of desire.

In spite of Densher's complex straggle in the novel's closing scenes and his
ultimate refusal to betray Milly—to swear to Kate that he is not in love with her

memory—critics, on the whole, do not like him. It has been argued that in the

end he fails to experience the self-examination that would imply a real conver
sion, and that his morally weak core has not changed.58 On the level of conven

tional ethics this may be true, but from the standpoint of an ethics of desire

Densher has relinquished not only Kate but also the struggle for completion
through her. He is no longer indentured to the will of others. And in his encounter

with Milly's lost letter, he embraces her understanding of the necessary relation

ship between desire and mortality. The ethical subject, in other words, must
undergo a purging of specific "objects" of desire in order to encounter "the real
Thing for which these objects are imaginary substitutes."59 This sudden insight
into the abyss of Being gives way to a new kind of fidelity. It is a moment that

invokes ethical behavior by calling the subject into being through what Badiou
calls "the real process of fidelity to an event."60
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And what of Milly's awareness or lack of awareness that she is bein

notion that Milly is a naive victim who is ultimately destroyed by the

is, her "discovery" of the real connection between Kate and Densher
Mark)—is difficult to reconcile with Milly's consistent awareness of
ship. While this does not lessen Kate's or Densher's responsibility, it
the moral issue for Milly, who is neither naive nor a victim. Rather,

live with the knowledge that her desire for Densher, like her desir

construction—in defiance of the "facts," but necessary to her. Like A
chooses her desire, knowing it is impossible, knowing she will lose.61

closing scenes, Milly's silence is more powerful than speech, reinforci

ditional nature of her gift. Although her letter has been destroyed, it h
destination, for it transforms her antagonists.62

Milly dies, accepting the paradoxical truth that Kate and Denshe

been, and not been, what they seemed. Just as they have literally

desire, she fulfills theirs in bequeathing Densher her money. Mill

embodying simultaneously her permanence and her transience,

opened letter, anticipates a structure of meaning that is fulfilled by D

recognition of himself as a man in mourning, not only for Milly bu

a man who must remain permanently in a state of lack. In these

James's characters enact a direct confrontation with the myth of co

they have engendered in pursuing their desire. In place of the En

model of an ethic associated with higher reason, a refinement of the

still, therefore, connected to what Badiou calls the "anarchic debris o

knowledge"),53 James anticipates a view of subjectivity (and implic

that can come into being only through a kind of madness—a recog
emptiness at the heart of being.

Through their pursuit of the truth that their objects of desire m

characters discover an "ethic of the Real"—what Badiou calls "the ethic o

In confronting permanent loss and universal lack, they experience

degrees, painful pleasure, preserving the authentic place of their jo

though the object of desire is empty.65 In this way they begin to ret

from what appears to be a profoundly relativistic world of competin

designs. As Alenka Zupancic has suggested, Lacan's ethic of desire has

in common with Kant's ethical demand that the individual act "for du

is generally recognized; she argues that in fact Kant and Lacan arrive

place. That is to say, the individual who pursues his or her desire t

comes to recognize that the object of desire is a substitute, somethin

one's (impossible) awareness of the Real, is ultimately acting "for dut

Lacanian terms, for desire alone—stripped of its object.66 James's

cover that the object of desire is the site of an imaginary blinding b

tially, the site of ethical truth: a place where the "self' and all the symb

creates to assure its coherence must eventually be recognized as an il
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By discovering the truth of their desire James's characters also discover their
own in-coherent selves, their shattered subjectivity. To return to James's image of

Milly as a "Lorelei" who will see her antagonists "terrified and tempted and
charmed; bribed away from more prescribed and natural orbits,"67 we see how

Milly initially pulls Kate and Densher out of a more "natural" ethical path by
tempting them with her money. But this passage may be read in an obverse way

(to borrow James's image of the two-sided coin): in the end Milly invites her
antagonists to abandon the "prescribed" path in order to understand the ethics of
desire. Like Antigone, Milly stands for that purification of desire that is "central
for access to any realization of oneself."68 She arrives at a place where her desire

is dis-interested, and therefore ethical: it has been emptied of content, and her
vulnerable gift of love is all that remains.69 Densher's poignant and loving con

templation of her silence suggests that he, too, understands that Milly has suc
cessfully altered his "orbit." At the end of The Wings of the Dove we witness
Densher's fidelity to the Event of Milly Theale. We also note that Kate witnesses
this Event: when she tells Densher he has fallen in love with Milly, admitting she

would have done so, too, in his place, she speaks a different kind of truth from
that which has guided her for most of the novel—it is a truth that contains the
kernel of a new ethic. Through Milly's letter, which functions as a kind of resur
rection, she insists on the truth that emerges through fidelity to one's desire. She

demands that her antagonists recognize her subjectivity—and through it, their
own. Milly's gift of love, embodied in her ethereal presence at the end of the novel

(a silent but powerful siren song), is an image of ethical action.

If poetry, as Badiou suggests, articulates our "essential disorientation . . .
cutis] open a space within historical pathos,"70 it is also, thereby, an Event that
"throws us outside of ourselves" and offers a "truth" that is not a "sense" but,
rather, "a hole in sense."71 And it is Milly, in the moment of her final descent into

her Venetian fortress, who most eloquently describes the status of the subject
who lives "between two deaths,"72 who sees, as the tragic heroine always does,
the strange and paradoxical envy of those (characters and readers) who bear wit
ness to (but are excluded from) the purity of her ethical condition:

She couldn't have said what it was, in the conditions, that renewed the

whole solemnity, but... a kind of wistful hush had fallen upon them,
as if before something poignant... That was nothing, verily, but the per

fection of the charm—or nothing, rather, but their excluded, disinher
ited state in the presence of it. The charm turned on them a face that was
cold in its beauty, that was full of a poetry never to be theirs, that spoke,

with an ironic smile, of a possible, but forbidden life.

(292)
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